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THE PREEXISTING RELATIONSHIP DOCTRINE UNDER
REGULATION D: A RULE WITHOUT REASON?
DAVID

B. H.

MARTIN, JR.*

L. KEITH PARSONS**
INTRODUCTION

Congress intended the Securities Act of 1933' (the "Securities Act") to
provide, principally through the registration process, full and fair disclosure
to purchasers of securities sold in interstate commerce. Because, however,
in many instances the registration requirements of the Securities Act are
unnecessary to protect investors or are unduly burdensome for small issuers
attempting to raise capital, Congress and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "Commission") have created exemptions from registration.
Of these exemptions, the three exemptions in regulation D2 under the
Securities Act have the broadest and most significant utility, especially for
small issuers. Prior to the adoption of regulation D in 1982,1 the Commission
had received a substantial number of comments complaining that compliance
with the federal securities laws was having an inordinate impact on small
businesses. Regulation D was a principal component of the Commission's
attempt to accommodate the concerns expressed on behalf of small businesses and the policy mandate of the Securities Act. Regulation D generally
has drawn support from commentators and practitioners. One of the requirements of regulation D, however, the prohibition on general solicitation
and general advertising in rule 502(c), has presented serious questions to
issuers and their counsel and has diminished the utility of regulation D
exemptions because of the requirement's uncertain reach and ambiguous
precedent. The Commission staff has amplified these problems by issuing
a series of particularly restrictive interpretations of rule 502(c). Specifically,
these interpretations imply that, to comply with rule 502(c), an issuer or its
agents must have a preexisting, substantive relationship with persons to
whom the securities are being offered. This Article examines the background
of the general solicitation and general advertising prohibition and argues
for a more liberal interpretation of rule 502(c), an interpretation that is
more consistent with the policies underlying regulation D and the Securities
Act.

*

Partner, Hogan & Hartson, Washington, D.C. Mr. Martin was Special Counsel to

the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 1984-85.
** Partner, Watkins Ludlam & Stennis, Jackson, Mississippi.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1987).

2. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-506 (1988).
3. Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited

Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L.
REP. (CCH) 83,106, at 84,907 (Mar. 8, 1982).
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In response to concerns that compliance with the requirements of the
4
Securities Act might unduly burden capital raising efforts by small issuers,
the Commission in 1978 began an extensive reexamination of the exemptive
scheme under the Securities Act. This reexamination included an experimental rule,5 publication of a concept release and solicitation of written
comments, 6 adoption of a simplified form of registration for small initial
public offerings (Form S-18), 7 and public hearings to determine "the extent
to which the burdens imposed on small business [could] be alleviated
consistent with the protection of investors." ' In the midst of the Commission's efforts, Congress provided further impetus for revising the Securities
Act exemptions for limited offerings by enacting the Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980. 9 This act amended section 3(b) of the Securities
Act to give the Commission authority to create exemptions for offerings up
to $5,000,000, expanded the definition of "accredited investor" in section
2(15) of the Securities Act, and provided for the development of a uniform,
federal-state exemption from registration for small issuers.
One of the principal elements in the Commission's reexamination of
the exemptive scheme under the Securities Act and a major response to the
new Congressional mandate was the proposal to adopt a new regulation,
regulation D, which would replace rules 240, 242, and 146 under the
Securities Act."' After receiving numerous substantive comments on this
proposal, the Commission adopted a revised version of regulation D,
effective April 15, 1982.1 Since then the Commission has amended regulation
4. See, e.g., Warren, A Review of Regulation D: The Present Exemption Regimen for
Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 Am. U. L. REv. 355, 356 (1984).
5. In 1980, the Commission adopted rule 242 (formerly 17 C.F.R. § 230.242), a limited
offering exemption under section 3(b) of the Securities Act, for offerings up to $2,000,000,
stating that the rule was in the "nature of an experiment." Exemption of Limited Offers and
Sales by Qualified Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6180, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,426, at 82812 (Jan. 17, 1980).
6. Consideration of the Impact of the Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980
on Certain Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, Securities
Act Release No. 6274, 46 Fed. Reg. 2631 (1981) (Release Date Dec. 23, 1980).
7. Simplified Registration and Reporting Requirements for Small Issuers, Securities Act
Release No. 6049, 44 Fed. Reg. 21,562 (1979) (Release Date Apr. 10, 1979).
8. Examination of the Effects of Rules and Regulations on the Ability of Small
Businesses to Raise Capital and the Impact on Small Businesses of Disclosure Requirements
Under the Securities Acts, Securities Act Release No. 5914, 43 Fed. Reg. 10,876 (1978) (Release
Date Mar. 6, 1978).
9. Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
10. See Proposed Revision of Certain Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of
the Securities Act of 1933 for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act
Release No. 6339, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,014, at 84,453
(Aug. 7, 1981).
11. Securities Act Release No. 6389, supra note 3. As stated in the adopting release, the
new regulation was "designed to simplify and clarify existing exemptions, to expand their
availability, and to achieve uniformity between Federal and state exemptions in order to
facilitate capital formation consistent with the protection of investors." Id.
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D twice,' 2 and the Commission staff has authored numerous interpretative
letters and one interpretative release.' 3
Regulation D provides three transactional exemptions from registration
under the Securities Act.' 4 Two of the exemptions, rules 504 and 505, were
adopted under section 3(b) of the Securities Act. The third exemption, rule

506, was adopted under section 4(2). Rule 504 is available for offerings up
to $1,000,000; rule 505 is available for offerings up to $5,000,000; and rule
506 is available for offerings without regard to the amount being raised.
Rules 504 and 505 replaced predecessor small issue exemptions under section
3(b), rules 240 and 242.15 Rule 506 replaced rule 146, a rule that the
Commission had adopted in 197416 to provide objective standards for
offerings under section 4(2) of the Securities Act, the so-called "private
offering" exemption. 7 These exemptions are part of a coordinated formulation of limited and private offering exemptions under the Securities Act
with common definitions, terms, and conditions set forth in rules 501
through 503.
BACKGROUND OF RULE

502(c)

With a limited exception, the Commission conditions each exemption
in regulation D upon the absence of general solicitation and general advertising." Specifically, rule 502(c) provides that

[n]either the issuer nor any person acting on its behalf shall offer
or sell the securities by any form of general solicitation or general

advertising, including, but not limited to, the following:
12. See Form D and Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 6663, [1986-1987 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 84,032, at 88,271 (Oct. 2, 1986); Regulation D Revisions,
Securities Act Release No. 6758, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,221, at 89,012 (Mar. 3, 1988). The Commission recently has proposed further amendments
to regulation D. See Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 6759, [1987-1988 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 84,222, at 89,016 (Mar. 3, 1988).

13. Interpretive Release on Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 6455, 48 Fed. Reg.
10,045 (1983) (Release Date Mar. 3, 1983).
4. Sections 3(a)(2) through 3(a)(8) of the Securities Act provide exemptions from
registration based on the type of security involved. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2)-(8) (1987). These
exemptions run with the securities and are available both for initial issuances by issuers and
secondary transactions. Sections 3(a)(9)-(11), 3(b) and 4(l)-(6) of the Securities Act provide
transactional exemptions, i.e., exemptions that apply only to particular offerings. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77c(a)(9)-(11), (b), 77d(1)-(6) (1987). Subsequent offers or sales of the securities issued
under these sections may only be made under another transactional exemption.
15. Rule 240 (formerly 17 C.F.R. § 230.240) was an exemption from registration for
offerings of $100,000 or less within a 12-month period. Rule 242 was an exemption from
registration for offerings of $2,000,000 or less within a 6-month period.
16. See Notice of Adoption of Rule 146 Under the Securities Act of 1933-"Transactions
By an Issuer Deemed Not to Involve Any Public Offering," Securities Act Release No. 5487,
39 Fed. Reg. 15,261 (1974) (Release Date Apr. 23, 1974).
17. Section 4(2) provides an exemption from registration for "transactions by an issuer

not involving any public offering."
18. Rule 504(b)(1) provides that the limitation on general advertising and general solici-

tation will not apply in certain state registered offerings.
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1. Any advertisement, article, notice or other communication published in any newspaper, magazine, or similar media or broadcast
over television or radio; and
2. Any seminar or meeting whose attendees have been invited by
any general solicitation or general advertising.' 9
The immediate source of this limitation on general advertising and
20
general solicitation is found in the similar provisions of former rule 146(c).
In addition, rules 240(c) and 242(d) contained manner of offering limitations
that were similar to rule 502(c). 2' Under regulation D's predecessor rules,
however, the limitation on general solicitation and general advertising had
not been a well-defined concept. The Commission released no significant
staff interpretations of the manner of offering limitation under rules 240
and 242 and only limited staff analyses of the prohibition under rule 146.
The Commission staff made clear, for instance, that advertising in publications generally was not permitted under rule 146. 22 This was hardly a

19. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (1988).
20. See Securities Act Release No. 6339, supra note 10.
21. Rule 146(c) provided as follows:
(c) Limitation on Manner of Offering. Neither the issuer nor any person acting
on its behalf shall offer, offer to sell, offer for sale, or sell the securities by means
of any form of general solicitation or general advertising, including but not limited
to, the following:
(1) Any advertisement, article, notice or other communication published in any
newspaper, magazine or similar medium or broadcast over television or radio;
(2) Any seminar or meeting, except that if paragraph (d)(1) of this section is
satisfied as to each person invited to or attending such seminar or meeting and, as
to persons qualifying only under paragraph (d)(1)(ii) of this section, suclb persons
are accompanied by their offeree representative(s), then such seminar or meeting
shall be deemed not to be a form of general solicitation or general advertising; and
(3) Any letter, circular, notice or other written communication, except that if
paragraph (d)(1) of this section is satisfied as to each person to whom the communication is directed, such communication shall be deemed not to be a form of general
solicitation or general advertising.
Rule 240(c) provided as follows:
(c) Limitation on Manner of Offering. The securities shall not be offered,
offered for sale or sold in reliance-on this rule by any means of general advertising
or general solicitation.
Rule 242(d) provided as follows:
(d) Limitation on Manner of Offering. Neither the issuer nor any person acting
on its behalf shall offer or sell securities pursuant to this rule by means of any form
of general solicitation or general advertising, including, but not limited to, any
advertisement, article, notice or other communication published in any newspaper,
magazine or similar medium or broadcast over the television or radio.
22. See, e.g., A.A. Ajax Co., SEC No-Action Letter, (Jan. 15, 1979) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, Noact file) (denying no-action relief to loan brokerage company that proposed
advertising in publication of special interest to pension and profit sharing plans); Trust Mortgage
and Loan Service, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, (Dec. 27, 1979) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact
file) (denying no-action relief to tri-state advertising campaign in general circulation newspapers,
soliciting investors for first and second trust deeds); Econative Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
(Feb. 27, 1978) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (denying no-action relief to broker/dealer
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profound proposition, however, given the private placement exemption
statutory foundation that would not reasonably lend support to such general
and public forms of promotion.23 Beyond this rudimentary tenet, interpretations of rule 146(c) were limited. 24
In large measure, the lack of interpretations in this area under rule 146
may have been due to the general flexibility of the rule. Rule 146(c) provided
that any letter, circular, notice or other written communication would not
be deemed a form of general solicitation or general advertising if all persons
to whom the communication was directed were qualified offerees under rule
146(d)(1). For offerees to meet the rule 146(d)(1) definition, the issuer had
to believe reasonably that the offeree had sufficient knowledge and experience in financial and business matters to evaluate capably the merits and
risks of the prospective investment, or that the offeree was a person who
was able to bear the economi6 risks. This provision operated as a "safe
harbor" within a "safe harbor" and minimized close questions on the
application of the condition prohibiting general solicitation.
From time to time the Commission has mentioned manner of offering
restrictions outside of rule 146 as a factor to be considered in determining
the availability of an exemption under section 4(2) of the Securities Act.
Precise guidelines for applying such restrictions are absent in legislative
history and judicial construction of that provision. Early legislative history
indicates that the private offering exemption was directed to transactions in
which there is no practical need for registration or in which the public
benefits of registration are too remote.Y Short of such policy pronouncements, however, the legislative history of the private offering exemption
furnishes little guidance on specific characteristics of a private offering.

who proposed advertisement seeking investment banking clients on the grounds that proposed
advertisement "would constitute the first step in a public offering and consequently would
exceed the boundaries set forth in [Rule 146(c)]"); Damson Oil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
(Jul. 5, 1974) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (finding that advertisement in in-flight airline
magazine designed to identify prospective oil and gas program investors did not comply with
rule 146).
23. See Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, 448 F.2d 680, 689 (5th Cir. 1971)
(holding that advertising is incompatible with claim of private offering); see also Waterman
v. Alta Verde Indus., 643 F. Supp. 797, 807 (E.D.N.C. 1986), aff'd, 833 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir.
1987).
24. One issue that was nettlesome under rule 146(c) and continues to bother the analysis
of the manner of offering limitation in regulation D involves determining whether a particular
communication actually was designed to sell securities. In Arthur M. Borden, SEC No-Action
Letter (Sept. 15, 1977) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) the staff advised that the provisions
of rule 146 did not permit an issuer or broker/dealer to solicit the names of prospective
qualified offerees from various intermediaries who would be qualified offerees themselves. In
a response to a subsequent request, however, the staff elaborated on its earlier position and
clarified that rule 146 would permit an offer to be made to a qualified offeree referred to an
issuer or broker/dealer by another qualified offeree provided the issuer or broker/dealer did
not solicit the names of any prospective qualified offerees from persons originally solicited.
Arthur M. Borden, SEC No-Action Letter, (Oct. 6, 1978) (LEXIS library, Noact file).
25. H.R. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
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In 1935 the Commission issued a release stating the opinion of its
General Counsel concerning the factors to be used in determining the
availability of the section 4(2) exemption. 26 One of those factors was the
manner of offering. As with many early Commission releases, however, this
statement was more conclusory than analytical. The General Counsel merely
stated that "I feel that transactions which are effected by direct negotiation
by the issuer are more likely to be non-public than those effected through
the use of the machinery of public distribution." 27 The Commission offered
little further analysis on general solicitation or general advertising in later
releases and commentaries. In fact, for many years the Commission emphasized, and courts and practitioners seemed to follow, an objective
standard based on the number of offerees as the dominant test. 28 The
Commission's 1935 release suggested that an offering to not more than
approximately twenty-five persons was not an offering to a substantial
number and presumably did not involve a public offering.
In 1953 the United States Supreme Court explicitly rejected the idea
that an objective numerical test should govern the applicability of the
nonpublic offering exemption. In SEC v. Ralston Purina29 the Supreme
Court found that an offering of stock to 500 company employees was not
exempt. In so doing, the Court rejected the Commission's contention that
the number of offerees was the critical factor. Instead, the Ralston Purina
Court stated that "[t]he focus of inquiry should be on the need of the
offerees for the protections afforded by registration;" and that "[t]he
employees here were not shown to have access to the kind of information
which registration would disclose." 30 The issuer had based its contention
that an exemption was available upon the fact that the offering was not
made indiscriminately to all of its 7,000 employees, but rather had been
restricted to those it considered "key employees." Some of the employees
that the issuer alleged to be "key employees," however, were low in the
company's organization and included clerks and foremen. In what has
become landmark language, the Supreme Court determined that the applicability of the exemption should turn on whether the particular class of
persons affected needs the protection of the Securities Act or whether such
persons are able "to fend for themselves." '3 Notably, the Ralston Purina
Court did not mention general solicitation or general advertising as factors
to consider when determining whether the nonpublic offering exemption

26. Opinion of General Counsel Concerning Exemption Under Section 4(1) of "Transactions By an Issuer Not Involving Any Public Offering," Securities Act Release No. 285,
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
2020.102, at 2740-2744 (Jan. 24, 1935).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Merger Mines Corp. v. Grismer, 137 F.2d 335 (9th Cir.) (offer by issuer
to its 1,100 shareholders could not qualify for nonpublic offering exemption), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 794 (1943).
29. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
30. SEC v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1953).
31. Id.
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applied. Rather, the Court found the offering not to be exempt because the
offering had reached some persons who lacked access to the kind of
information that registration ordinarily would have provided and who thus
needed the protection of the Securities Act.
The Ralston Purina test has weathered much application. Its simplicity
and general utility for even the most complex factual analyses have made
the test close to the common denominator in section 4(2) case law. Some
courts have amplified the Ralston Purinatest by articulating various factors
that should be considered when determining whether an offering is nonpublic. Courts have stated, for instance, that the question of what determines
a public offering is one of fact and depends on the circumstances of each
particular case. These courts have included as relevant such factors as the
relationship between the offerees and the issuer, and the nature, scope, size,
type, and manner of the offering.12 In a significant release in the early
1960s the Commission took a similar approach by evaluating various factors
that bear on the availability of the private offering exemption. 33 One factor
was the predecessor to the manner of offering condition in rule 146(c). The
Commission noted that
[n]egotiations or conversations with or general solicitations of an
unrestricted and unrelated group of prospective purchasers for the
purpose of ascertaining who would be willing to accept an offer of
securities is inconsistent with a claim that the transaction does not
involve a public offering even though ultimately there may only be
34
a few knowledgeable purchasers.
The Commission further reasoned that care should be taken when an offeror
employs the services of an investment banker or other facility through which
public distributions are normally effected. The release also pointed out that
public advertising was incompatible with a claim of a private offering.
Rule 502(c) of regulation D succeeded to this hazy precedent with little
explanation. Moreover, the elimination in rule 502(c) of the "qualified
offeree" exception found in rule 146(c) placed the manner of offering
condition in a position of new and exposed importance. In this context the
Commission staff has addressed a large number of requests for interpretation, both formal and informal, of the manner of offering limitation.
Without clear precedent or an analytical model, the staff's responses have
begun to produce a regulatory common law that has little grounding in the
35
statute from which the regulation derives.

32. See, e.g., Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977);
Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, 448 F.2d 680, 689 (5th Cir. 1971); Garfield v.
Strain, 320 F.2d 116 (10th Cir. 1963); Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1959);
Campbell v. Degenther, 97 F. Supp. 975 (D. Pa. 1951).
33. See Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4552, 27 Fed. Reg.
11,316 (1962) (Release Date Nov. 6, 1962).
34. Id.
35. One of the first commentaries on the new regulations accurately predicted this
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502(c)

Rule 502(c) provides that neither the issuer nor any person acting on
the issuer's behalf shall offer or sell securities by means of any form of
general solicitation or general advertising. Analysis of rule 502(c) should
center on its three elements:
(1) the issuer or any person acting on the issuer's behalf
(2) offering or selling securities by means of
(3) general solicitation or general advertising.
By or on Behalf of the Issuer
Regarding the first element of rule 502(c), the significant interpretive
issue has involved determining whether the activity in question has been
conducted by a person acting on the issuer's behalf. The staff generally has
taken a cautious, though logical, approach. If an issuer has had no contact
with or ability to influence the content of a communication, and if the
communication has no direct connection with a current or immediately
prospective offering, the Commission staff has deemed the activity not to
be on the issuer's behalf. This proposition derives most clearly from a series
of requests for interpretation regarding newsletters.
In Richard Daniel 6 the Commission staff found a newsletter containing
public information regarding private limited partnerships in Arizona not to
be a general advertisement by or on behalf of the limited partnerships
because none of the limited partnerships provided the information or paid
to have the material included in the newsletter. In Nancy H. Blasberg37 the
Commission staff reached a similar conclusion about a newsletter containing
publicly available information regarding privately-placed or closely-held
preferred stock of utility, industrial, financial, and transportation companies. If the issuer prepares or pays for the inclusion of information in a
newsletter, however, the Commission staff appropriately has found such
involvement to render publication of the newsletter as being on the issuer's
38
behalf.

development: "Since there is no longer a requirement (comparable to Rule 146(d)(I)) to prescreen offerees, it can be anticipated that a body of interpretive law will develop regarding
the terms 'general solicitation,' and 'general advertising.' " Schneider, Introduction to Regulation D, 15 REv. SEc. RE.

990, 996 (1982).

36. SEC No-Action Letter, (Dec. 19, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
37. SEC No-Action Letter, (Jul. 12, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
38. See, e.g., J.D. Manning, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1985-86 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) j 78,219, at 76,859 (Dec. 20, 1985); The Texas Investor Newsletter,
SEC No-Action Letter, (Jan. 23, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); see also Oil and
Gas Investor, SEC No-Action Letter (Sept. 9, 1983) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file) (Sept.
9, 1983) (taking no position on whether newsletter would be deemed issuer's general solicitation
because not enough facts as to issuer's involvement); Tax Investment Information Corporation,
SEC No-Action Letter, [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 77,379, at
78,393 (Feb. 7, 1983) (refusing to concur that newsletter was not general advertisement by or
on behalf of issuer because no facts on issuer's involvement were available).
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An issue in this area that the Commission staff has not resolved is
whether to use principles of agency law to impute to an issuer the conduct
of employees or third party contractors. The reference to agency law might
have a certain superficial appeal given the lack of substantive doctrine
underlying rule 502(c). However, the policies governing agency law are not
necessarily at issue in the context of a securities offering. Assume, for
instance, that an issuer is conducting a limited and controlled mailing to
selected individuals in connection with a regulation D offering. Assume
further that an employee of the issuer makes an unauthorized distribution
of this mailing to hundreds of persons on a mailing list obtained from a
third party. If the issuer can establish that it did not authorize this
distribution, and if the issuer does not sell securities to persons who receive
the distribution, it is not clear that a regulation D exemption for the issuer's
offering should be invalidated by the employee's unauthorized conduct,
even if the employee might be deemed the issuer's agent under agency law.
Offering or Selling Securities by Means of
Beyond determining whether a particular communication is by or on
behalf of an issuer, it.is necessary under rule 502(c) to determine whether
the issuer is offering or selling securities by means of the communication.
If a communication postdates an isolated offering, there generally should
be little question that the activity is not part of an offer or sale. 40 Advertisements and other widespread communications during or before an offering, however, present closer factual questions.
In GeraldF. Gerstenfeld41 counsel to several syndicators requested advice
about the publication in newspapers of an institutional advertisement relating
to a syndicator as an entity and not to any given limited partnership. The
Commission staff reasoned that the advertisement, which clearly was "general," would violate rule 502(c) if its primary purpose was to sell securities
of entities that were or would be affiliated with the syndicator. Because it
appeared the syndicators were using the advertisements to sell securities or
to condition the market for future sales, the staff found that the advertisements would constitute offers "even at a time when securities are not being
sold if the syndicator expects in the near future to offer and sell securities."

39. Often a question regarding issuer involvement under the first prong of rule 502(c)
or regarding whether a solicitation is "general" under the third prong of the rule can be
rephrased under this element. If, for instance, it is unclear whether the activity is by or on
behalf of the issuer, it may be ,nore certain that, in any event, the activity is not related to
the offer or sale of securities.

40. See Alma Securities Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, (Aug. 2, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, Noact file) (although unable to express view given lack of facts, staff noted that
tombstone advertisement could be published without being used to offer or sell securities if
such advertisement followed completion of isolated regulation D offering and was not directed
at any contemporaneous or subsequent offers or sales of securities by same issuer).
41. SEC No-Action Letter, (Dec. 3, 1985), [1985] Wash. Serv. Bur. Microfiche, Fiche
976, Frame FI1.
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In Young, Smith & Peacock, Inc. 42 a broker/dealer proposed to issue a
generic newspaper advertisement to attract interest in "tax advantaged
investments specifically designed for accredited investors." Prior to its actual
publication and absent additional facts, the Commission staff was unable
to determine whether the advertisement would relate to a particular offer
and sale of securities. In Randall S. Dalton, Esq.43 a licensed real estate
broker advertised space available for tenants in an office building. Because
all tenants in the building were to be given an opportunity to participate in
the building's contemporaneous syndication, the Commission staff refused
to take a position on whether the broker's activities would be deemed an
offering and sale of securities by means of general advertising. The staff
also has refused to take a position on generic product advertising that a
company published at the same time the company was conducting a regulation D offering. 44
Solicitations of information prior to an offering, unlike advertising to
condition a market, might not be deemed offers or sales. In Bateman
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. 45 a broker/dealer proposed to let some of its
account executives make a mailing to prospective investors. The mailing
would include a questionnaire and a letter. After reviewing responses to the
questionnaire, account executives would contact certain respondents to obtain additional information. The account executives would not send offering
materials for at least forty-five days following a preliminary mailing. Noting
that the proposed solicitation was generic in nature and would not refer to
any specific investment currently offered or contemplated, the Commission
staff agreed with counsel's view that the program would not constitute an
offer to sell securities.
6

'4
Interpretation of the Term "General Solicitation"

By far the most difficult and pervasive questions under rule 502(c) of
regulation D have concerned the determination of what will be deemed a

42. SEC No-Action Letter, (Apr. 8, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
43. SEC No-Action Letter, (Jun. 22, 1984) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
44. Se Printing Enterprises Management Science, Inc. SEC No-Action Letter, (Apr. 25,
1983) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file); see also REMCO Securities, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter (Aug. 20, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact File) (failing to express view on legality
of press release announcing completion of two oil wells owned by two private limited
partnerships where affiliate of those partnerships was conducting contemporaneous regulation
D offerings); Alma Securities Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Aug. 2, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec
library, Noact file) (failing to confirm that tombstone advertisement announcing completion
of offer was not in violation of rule 502(c) because there were no facts on the possibility of
contemporaneous or subsequent offers or sales of securities by same or affiliated issuer).
45. SEC No-Action Letter, (Dec. 3, 1985) (LEXIS Fedsec library, Noact file).
46. The concept of "general advertising" has presented no interpretive issues of significance. Generally, the Commission staff considers any advertisement published in a newspaper,
magazine, or other print medium or issued over broadcast media to be "general." This would
be so even if the issuer limited circulation because these forms of advertising have no controls
and can be spread indefinitely and indiscriminately. In Aspen Grove, SEC No-Action Letter,
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"general solicitation." This difficulty generally did not arise under rule
146(c) because of .the "qualified offeree" exception. Under rule 146, a
solicitation was not "general" if the issuer could establish that it had been
made only to "qualified offerees." This exception is not available under
rule 502(c). In its place, however, the staff has developed an interpretation
that virtually requires all recipients of a solicitation to have a preexisting,
substantive relationship with the issuer to establish that a particular solici47
tation is not "general."
The Commission staff initiated the focus on preexisting relationships
only months after the adoption of regulation D in the staff's first interpretive
letter addressing the issue of "general solicitation." In Woodtrails-Seattle,
Ltd.48 the general partner of a limited partnership proposed to make a
written offer to sell interests in the limited partnership to over 300 persons
who previously had invested in limited partnership offerings sponsored by
the general partner. The general partner made the offering in reliance on
rule 505 of regulation D. The Commission staff found that the proposed
offers would not violate the terms of rule 502(c). The staff noted that each
of the proposed offerees had a preexisting business relationship with the
general partner. The staff also noted that
the nature of this relationship is evidenced, in part, by the determination by the general partner at the time of the original investment
that the investors met certain suitability standards and by the belief
by Woodtrails that each of the proposed offerees currently has such

(Dec. 8, 1982) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file), the staff declined to give "no-action"
relief for a limited partnership's advertising campaign involving racehorses. The partnership
proposed to distribute brochures and to adveritise in a trade journal. The staff viewed the
advertising component of the promotion as "general" even though circulation may have been
limited to a specialized audience.
47. Apart from the fact that this interpretation may represent an evolutionary return to
the "qualified offeree" concept of rule 146(c), the "preexisting relationship" test may also be
an attempt to resurrect a judicial standard that has long been discredited. In 1938 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in SEC v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d
699 (9th Cir. 1938), held that to determine the distinction between "public" and "private,"
it is necessary to find a "sensible relationship" between the basis for selecting prospective
investors and the purposes for which the selection was made. This test was not only too
difficult to apply but also was not particularly logical. It is, for instance, not always clear
what constitutes a "sensible relationship" between the class of investors selected and the
purpose of the selection. Also, even if a "sensible relationship" exists, the particular transaction
might not deserve exemption as a private offering. While the reasoning of Sunbeam generally
has not been persuasive, the following language from the case has been a popular adornment
to section 4(2) analysis and may be an implicit consensus on what "nonpublic" connotes:
An offering of securities to all red-headed men, to allresidents of Chicago or San
Francisco, to all existing stockholders of the General Motors Corporation or the
American Telephone & Telegraph Company, is no less "public" in every realistic
sense of the word, than an unrestricted offering to the world at large.
Id. at 701.
48. SEC No-Action Letter, [1982-83 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 77,342,
at 78,284 (Aug. 8, 1982).
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knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he
or she is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective
49
investment.
Seizing on this preexisting relationship factor, the Commission staff
firmly entrenched the standard in a series of subsequent interpretive letters.
In E.F. Hutton & Co.O and Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc., 51broker/
dealer firms sought to send offering materials to lists of investors that the
firms had developed through general solicitations. Both firms described
programs whereby prospective investors were identified through suitability
questionnaires and other inquiries to determine personal and financial
information as well as investment objectives. The Commission staff held
that a prescreening process could establish a substantive relationship with
persons if those persons provided responses to questionnaires sufficient to
enable the issuer or its agent to evaluate the sophistication and financial
circumstances of the respondees. In both of these cases, however, the staff
found the proposed questionnaires were not detailed enough for the firms
properly to evaluate respondees' sophistication and financial circumstances.
Assuming for argument that a substantive relationship had been established
through the questionnaire process, the staff emphasized that the relationship
must be "preexisting"-that is, established prior to any offer that had
commenced or was contemplated-for the general solicitation not to be
52
deemed part of an offer or sale.
The Commission staff reinforced the analysis of E.F. Hutton and
Bateman Eichler in a subsequent letter in which the broker/dealer firm's
prescreening questionnaire was sufficiently detailed to serve as the basis for
establishing a substantive relationship. In H.B. Shaine & C0.5 3 a broker/
dealer proposed the use of questionnaires to identify investors who would
be either "accredited" under rule 501(a)(1) or sophisticated in the context
of rule 506. The broker/dealer would update the questionnaires annually
and the questionnaires would serve as the basis for an established client list
of the firm. Subsequent private placements would be offered to individuals
that the prescreening process had identified as being qualified. In agreeing

49. Id.

50. SEC No-Action Letter, (Dec. 3, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
51. SEC No-Action Letter, (Dec. 3, 1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
52. In Mineral Lands Research & Marketing Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, (Dec. 4,
1985) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file), the staff reiterated the preexisting relationship test
but found insufficient facts from which to draw a conclusion as to the solicitation by a
company's officers and directors, one of whom was an insurance broker who proposed to
offer securities to up to 600 of his existing clientele. The staff stated that
the types of relationships with offerees that may be important in establishing that a
general solicitation has not taken place are those that would enable the issuer (or a
person acting on its behalf) to be aware of the financial circumstances or sophistication of the persons with whom the relationship exists or that otherwise are of
some substance and duration.
Id.

53. SEC No-Action Letter, (May 1, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
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that the questionnaires provided sufficient detail to establish a substantive
relationship, the Commission staff stated that "a satisfactory response by
a prospective offeree to a questionnaire that provides a broker/dealer with
sufficient information to evaluate the respondent's sophistication and financial situation will establish a substantive relationship." Because this relationship would be established prior to any offering, the staff also agreed
that the relationship was "preexisting."
54
Webster Management Assured Return Equity Management Group Trust
represents perhaps the most extreme application of the preexisting relationship criterion to date. In Webster Management, a placement agent proposed
to sell units of beneficial interest in a group trust to groups of pension,
profit-sharing and other employee benefit trusts, the characteristics of which
indicated a high degree of investor sophistication. The minimum investment
was $250,000. The applicant conceded that the placement agent would not
have any prior relationship with some of the offerees but was of the view
that the solicitation would not be deemed "general" because all purchases
in the offering would be substantial, the trustees for the trusts would be
sophisticated, and registration would be costly and unnecessarily burdensome
for this kind of offering. The Commission staff refused to issue a favorable
response, placing significant emphasis on the absence of a preexisting
relationship with some of the trusts. The staff also implicated the old rule
146(c) qualified offeree standard by noting that "some offerees would not
even be accredited as defined in rule 501(a)(1), although highly sophisticated" and underscored the fact that there was no limit on the manner by
55
which trusts would be contacted.
CRITIQUE OF RULE

502(c)

AND ITS APPLICATION

Although there is little substantive precedent for limiting general solicitation and general advertising in exemptions for limited and nonpublic
offerings, the Commission has a logical and justifiable basis for imposing
some conditions on the manner by which exempt offerings of this nature
are conducted. As applied to offerings under section 4(2), for instance, the
use of the term "public" in the statute certainly seems to call for some
limitation on the manner of offering. And, in fact, there always has been
support for certain implicit manner of offering limitations on general
advertising and the use of selling syndicates and other public offering
machinery. Few, if any, interpretive questions have arisen as to limitations
of this nature, and most issuers find such limitations predictable, comprehensible, and reasonable.

54. SEC No-Action Letter, (Feb. 7, 1987) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file).
55. See also Robert T. Willis, Jr., P.C., SEC No-Action Letter, (Jan. 18, 1988) (LEXIS,
Fedsec library, Noact file) (finding that solicitation by investment adviser of existing clientele
and new referrals was not in compliance with rule 502(c) due to lack of preexisting relationship

with issuer).
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The Commission staff, however, has gone well beyond those limits by
adopting an unduly restrictive and unsupported interpretation of the phrase
"general solicitation." The staff's interpretive letters under rule 502(c)
indicate that the staff believes a preexisting relationship between the issuer
or its agents and offerees to be an almost absolute prerequisite to avoiding
general solicitation in a regulation D offering. The type of relationship
required is one that allows the issuer to evaluate the financial circumstances
and sophistication of the offerees or one that otherwise is of some substance
and duration. The only methods of establishing these relationships that the
staff has approved are prior investments by the offerees with the issuer or
its agents and the use of questionnaires in accordance with criteria developed
56
in E.F. Hutton, Bateman Eichler and H.B. Shaine.
The Commission staff has indicated informally that there may be
circumstances under which "general solicitation" would not be present even
though the issuer had no preexisting relationship with the offerees. Moreover, it appears likely that in pending rulemaking involving a proposed rule
508 to regulation D the Commission may indicate that in fact the staff is
not of the view that the existence of preexisting relationships is the only
way to comply with rule 502(c). Little guidance, however, has been provided
as to the circumstances where preexisting relationships would not be required. Uncertainty on this issue is further suggested by informal statements
by members of the staff to the effect that the issuer's actual knowledge of
the financial circumstances or sophistication of offerees is irrelevant in
determining whether a general solicitation has occurred. These informal
statements contradict statements in interpretive letters, particularly Webster
Management, that imply that the issuer's knowledge is relevant.
In articulating the conditions for establishing a private offering exemption under section 4(2), the Supreme Court in Ralston Purina reasoned that
(1) the purpose of the Securities Act is "to protect investors by promoting
full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment
decisions," (2) "the natural way to interpret the private offering exemption
is in light of the statutory purpose," and (3) the applicability of the
exemption should turn on whether the particular class of persons affected
needs the protections afforded by the Securities Act. Given this reasoning,
the Commission should apply the general solicitation prohibition under
regulation D in a manner that, in conjunction with the other elements of

56. Even prior investments standing alone may not be sufficient. Under Woodtrails, the
Commission staff cited prior investments as evidence of a preexisting relationship, but the
staff also considered other factors as to the substance of the relationship. Presumably, the
staff would not sanction a solicitation of a substantial number of shareholders of a corporation
on the grounds that their prior investment -established the required preexisting relationship.
Early section 4(2) case law stumbled over this dichotomy. Compare Merger Mines Corp. v.
Grismer, 137 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1943) (solicitation of 1,100 shareholders contravened private
offering exemption) with Campbell v. Degenthers, 97 F. Supp. 975 (W.D. Pa. 1951) (holding
solicitation of persons who had previously invested in oil drilling ventures by same promoter
on similar properties to be nonpublic offering).
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the regulation, will result in the exemptions afforded being available in
circumstances in which investors do not need the protections afforded by
the Securities Act. Logically, this would mean that, to the extent "general
solicitation" is to be limited, the distinction between "general" and "nongeneral" would be drawn by objective criteria designed to prevent solicitation
from being so widespread or uncontrolled that investors who are unable to
fend for themselves are brought into an offering. While preexisting relationships may be a sufficient condition to demonstrate the absence of
general solicitation, it should not be a necessary condition, because, as an
independent factor, the preexisting relationship criterion has little, if any,
bearing on whether the protections of the Securities Act are necessary in
particular circumstances.
The Commission staff may have fixed on the preexisting relationship
test for a number of reasons. First, one may argue that knowledge of the
financial circumstances and sophistication of offerees obtained through
preexisting relationships is important to protect potential investors. Through
the accredited investor concept of rule 501(a) and through the sophistication
requirements of rule 506 regulation D takes into account the fact that
sophisticated or wealthy investors have less need for the protection of the
Securities Act, while not limiting the availability of the exemption to
offerings directed solely to those persons. It is the actual financial circumstance or sophistication of the investor, however, that is essential to that
analysis. To require that the issuer have knowledge regarding financial
circumstances or sophistication in advance of an offering through preexisting
relationships is superfluous.
Another basis for the preexisting relationship requirement could be the
knowledge of the issuer that the offerees would have because of the
relationship. For example, a key employee's relationship with an issuer may
be such that the employee has no need for the type of disclosure required
under the Securities Act. There is no justification for elevating the preexisting
relationship factor to an absolute requirement on this basis, however,
because offerees can be protected adequately in other ways in the absence
of preexisting relationships, for example, through the information requirements of rule 502(b).
Finally, an unspoken reason for the preexisting relationship doctrine
may be the possibility that an issuer could, at least in theory, make a
regulation D offering to an unlimited number of offerees. To some members
of the Commission staff, making an offering to an unlimited number of
offerees may seem inconsistent with a limited offering exemption17 The
preexisting relationship criterion certainly limits the number of potential
offerees for some small issuers. Under E.F. Hutton, Bateman Eichler, and
H.B. Shaine, however, if a seller employs a brokerage firm, the brokerage

57. See Securities Act Release No. 6339, supra note 10, at 84,464 n.30 (offerings to large
number of purchasers may involve violation of prohibitions against general solicitation and
general advertising). "
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firm may be able to access a multitude of prequalified eligible prospects.
Ironically, the preexisting relationship criterion has created a situation in
which those entities that constitute the "machinery of public offerings" can
utilize regulation D more easily than can the small issuer that regulation D
was designed to benefit. In any event, the number of offerees, in and of
itself, should have no relationship to whether the protections afforded by
the Securities Act are necessary.
Regardless of the rationale employed, preexisting relationships are not
accurate indicators of whether offerees need the protections afforded by the
Securities Act. Instead, the focus should be on whether, considering the
particular exemption being utilized and all relevant circumstances, the manner by which the communication is occurring is so widespread and uncontrolled that it creates a substantial likelihood of involving investors for
whom the protections of the Securities Act are necessary. To this end, the
Commission staff should view preexisting relationships as only one way in
which the nature and extent of the solicitation can be measured.
Because of the restrictions imposed by other provisions of regulation
D, it is questionable whether the prohibition against general solicitation is
necessary for investor protection in many offerings that qualify for an
exemption under regulation D. In particular, the prohibition against general
solicitation does not appear necessary for investor protection in offerings
meeting the requirements of rule 506 or in any offering that is limited to
accredited investors.5 s The Commission should restrict the applicability of
the general solicitation prohibition to those offerings in which the presence
of general solicitation is relevant to investor protection.
CONCLUSION

The purpose of the registration provisions of the Securities Act is to
compel the disclosure of information about issuers of securities to persons
interested in purchasing the securities so that the interested persons can
make informed investment decisions. Congress intended exemptions from
registration for limited or nonpublic offerings to cover offerings to persons
who can make informed investment decisions without having received the
benefits of the registration process. In certain instances it may be inappropriate to permit unbridled general solicitation or general advertising in
offerings that are exempt from registration. Neither legislative history nor
case law under the private offering exemption of the Securities Act, however,
suggests that any single factor is dispositive of whether an issuer's actions
constitute general solicitation. Rather, the focus has been on the more

58. In this regard, it is interesting to note that in a current rulemaking proceeding
involving proposed conditions for the resale of restricted securities, the Commission is proposing
to ignore manner of offering conditions entirely where purchasers (not offerees) are institutions
satisfying certain standards. See Resale of Restricted Securities; Changes to Method of
Determining Holding Period of Restricted Securities Under Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act
Release No. 6806, 53 Fed. Reg. 44,016 (1988) (Release Date Oct. 25, 1988).
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substantive question of whether an offering as a whole is conducted so that
it reaches persons who need the protections of the registration process. In
general, the Commission successfully has reduced the broad policy direction
of the Securities Act to objective criteria in regulatory exemptions established
by regulation D. The condition in rule 502(c) prohibiting general solicitation
in regulation D exemptions as currently interpreted, however, lacks a sound
basis in policy and in judicial and regulatory precedent. It is not difficult
to support the proposition that limited and nonpublic offering exemptions
should not include general advertising or other means of mass communication that would create a likelihood that securities will be sold to investors
who require the protection of the registration provisions of the Securities
Act. It does not follow from a well-reasoned analysis, however, that limited
or nonpublic offering exemptions should be conditioned on the existence of
preexisting relationships among issuers and offerees. Preexisting relationships
may be relevant to the scope or the manner of offering but should not be
preconditions to an exemption. The Commission staff should revise its
interpretation of the phrase "general solicitation" so that offerings which
do not involve investors who require the protections of the registration
process under the Securities Act will not be excluded arbitrarily from
coverage under regulation D.
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